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Abstract 
Understanding diverse performance trajectories of projects is of interest to 
operations researchers and practitioners. Interactions between multiple phases of a project 
are commonly assumed to be important in project dynamics, yet the strength of these 
feedback mechanisms has not been rigorously evaluated. In this study we use data from 
15 construction projects to estimate the feedbacks between design and construction 
phases. The estimated factors reveal that undiscovered design rework diminishes 
construction quality and production rate significantly and construction completion speeds 
up the detection of undiscovered design rework. Together these feedbacks can explain as 
much as 20% of variability in overall project costs. Comparison of model predictions 
with a separate set of 15 projects shows good predictive power for cost and schedule 
outcomes and their uncertainty. The estimation and prediction framework offers a 
template for using data from multiple cases to estimate both case-specific and industry-
wide parameters of project models, and for leveraging those estimates for project 
planning. 
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1- Introduction 
Projects are critical to how modern organizations structure work. Moreover, faster 
product life cycles and increasingly global supply chains require firms to organize many 
steps of once routine operations, such as manufacturing and production processes, as 
projects (Gunasekaran and Ngai 2012). Therefore project management is increasingly an 
important part of operations management research and practice. Related operations 
literature has largely focused on designing algorithms for efficiently planning the 
execution of a project and offering decision support based on this algorithmic framework 
(Tavares 2002). Besides this academic literature, practitioner knowledge communities, 
such as the Project Management Institute, have elicited and codified best practices and 
offer various training and certification options to individuals and organizations (Williams 
2005).  
Despite the importance of projects and the management tools designed and 
applied by the research and practitioner communities, many projects fall short of their 
targets. From software (Moløkken and Jørgensen 2003) to construction (Mansfield, 
Ugwu and Doran 1994), infrastructure (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 2003), and military 
applications (Drezner, Jarvaise, Hess et al. 1993), delays, cost overruns, and quality 
problems have plagued many projects. For example, Standish Group’s biennial surveys 
of the IT industry have found significant cost and budget overruns and cancellations in 
the majority of surveyed projects and a Procter & Gamble survey found that 15% of 
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authorized projects cost over 50% more than the original budget (Scott-Young and 
Samson 2008). Similarly, the U.S. General Accounting Office found cost overruns 
between 40% and 400% in a sample of 20 large infrastructure projects across 17 states 
(General Accounting Office 2002). In fact, disagreements over projects’ fates instigate 
many legal disputes (Callahan, Bramble and Lurie 1990), some of them in the billions of 
dollars, and may even play a role in national politics (Pear, LaFraniere and Austen 2013).  
Significant delays and cost overruns have motivated a more critical look at the 
assumptions that underlie operations research on projects. Specifically, the conventional 
project management paradigm is based on the decomposition of total project work into 
smaller, sequentially dependent tasks and algorithmic planning of the optimal sequencing 
and resource allocation within a project (Pollack 2007). However, there is an increasing 
realization that projects include many uncertainties and structural, dynamic, and socio-
political complexities (Checkland and Winter 2006; Winter 2006; Geraldi, Maylor and 
Williams 2011). These complexities require a more systemic approach that is able to 
incorporate organizational and psychological antecedents to project performance (Hong, 
Nahm and Doll 2004; Bendoly and Swink 2007; Hagen and Park 2013) as well as 
feedback loops and nonlinearities that may trigger unintended consequences of the 
conventional approach to project planning (Ackermann, Eden and Williams 1997; 
Williams 2005; Lyneis and Ford 2007; Mingers and White 2010).  
In response, research into understanding the root causes of project challenges has 
followed two complementary directions. Several empirical studies in this domain have 
used surveys of clients, contractors, and design personnel to assess the magnitude of cost 
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and schedule overruns and their root causes (Mansfield et al. 1994; Assaf, Alkhalil and 
Alhazmi 1995; Chan and Kumaraswamy 1997; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Sambasivan and 
Soon 2007; Scott-Young et al. 2008). A few common themes emerge from these studies. 
First, the quality and the extent of early design and planning are key to project 
performance. Second, factors that influence the quality of task implementation, from 
experience to technical complexity, are critical contributors to overall performance. 
Third, late changes requested by clients often lead to many ripple effects that cost the 
project beyond the direct cost of those changes.  Finally, the leadership and team 
structure and incentives moderate the impact of project-specific factors on performance. 
Nevertheless, different survey designs, and recall and other biases associated with 
retrospective studies, complicate the quantitative integration of these findings to tease out 
different causal mechanisms responsible for project performance and to provide 
quantitative decision support. 
A second research stream has applied simulation modeling to understanding 
project dynamics and improving project management (Lyneis et al. 2007; Mingers et al. 
2010). From task interdependence, to design and implementation quality, testing, and 
intermittent change requests, projects involve tightly interconnected factors that interact 
over time to determine project performance. Starting with a model that informed the 
arbitration of a ship-building project lawsuit (Cooper 1980), this line of modeling has 
grown to be one of the most successful areas of system dynamics (SD) practice (Lyneis et 
al. 2007). The rework cycle—the phenomenon of low work quality resulting in rework 
and change orders that extend required resources and duration—is at the core of project 
models and has ample empirical support (Hanna, Russell, Gotzion et al. 1999; Hanna and 
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Gunduz 2004; Ibbs 2005; Moselhi, Assem and El-Rayes 2005; Alnuaimi, Taha, Al 
Mohsin et al. 2010; Jarratt, Eckert, Caldwell et al. 2011). Moreover, from early on the 
modelers identified the importance of disaggregating these models to include multiple 
phases or task groupings (Lyneis et al. 2007). Formulating multi-phase project models 
was discussed in detail by Ford and Sterman (1998) and many applications have used 
different variants of this formulation in different industries (Lee, Han and Pena-Mora 
2009; Park, Kim, Lee et al. 2011; Khoueiry, Srour and Yassine 2013). In this formulation 
each phase of the project is modeled with a separate rework cycle, with the knock-on 
effects of the quality and progress of each phase on the successive phases. Different 
effects could be conceived in this setup, the most prominent of which are the impact of 
early phase quality on later phase productivity, the effect of early quality on later quality, 
and the effect of later completion of tasks on the discovery of errors in earlier phases. 
These effects could then activate endogenous rework, schedule pressure, and morale 
feedback loops within different phases, leading to much variability in project 
performance, quality, and costs (Ford et al. 1998; Lyneis et al. 2007). However, the 
strengths of these feedback mechanisms have been assumed based on qualitative 
knowledge or single case study estimates. Rigorous and multi-project empirical estimates 
are lacking in the literature, partly due to limited data. Yet such estimates are critical for 
understanding the relative impact of different dynamic mechanisms that underlie project 
performance heterogeneity.  
A few statistical studies have analyzed the latent impact of design error on the 
construction phase.  Baruti and colleagues (1992) reported that design defects are 
responsible for 79% of total change costs, and 9.5% of total project cost. Cusack (1992) 
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showed that documentation errors increase project costs 10%. Hanna and colleagues 
(2002) found that design errors lead to 38%-50% of change orders in the projects they 
studied. And recently, Lopez and Love (2012) showed that the average of direct and 
indirect costs for design errors is about 7% of contract value. Nevertheless, estimates that 
clearly delineate the different causal pathways through which design errors influence the 
quality and productivity of construction work are lacking.  
Moreover, the impact of these feedbacks is most relevant in the context of their 
interaction with other feedback mechanisms in the project dynamics. For example, design 
quality problems may lead to construction delays exacerbating burnout and morale 
problems, which can lead to further deterioration of construction quality and a more 
salient rework problem. Capturing such interactions is necessary for understanding the 
many instances of late and failed projects and requires a dynamic modeling framework 
that provides reliable estimates of the interacting factors. 
In this study we develop a system dynamics model of project dynamics, 
empirically estimating both project-specific parameters and industry-wide inter-phase 
feedbacks. In light of the important roles these feedback effects play in many project 
models, a reliable quantitative estimate will deepen our theoretical understanding of the 
causal pathways in project performance, allow us to assess the relative role of these 
feedbacks in project performance heterogeneity, and strengthen the practical models for 
project planning and project dispute resolution. Moreover, our methodological approach 
provides a blueprint for estimating and using project-specific and industry-wide 
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parameters of dynamic models across other contexts, such as software, energy, 
infrastructure, military, and aerospace projects.  
2- Data and Methods  
In this study, we quantify the design-construction feedback relationships in 
design-bid-build (DBB) construction projects. In contrast to concurrent design and 
construction, DBB is a project delivery method in which design services to produce 
construction documents (CD Design) are performed separately from, and before, actual 
construction. Moreover, in the construction phase a design firm—usually the same firm 
that was hired for the design phase—is hired to provide inspection and design services 
during construction. While overlapping design and construction is common in 
construction projects due to their time savings (Ford and Sterman 2003), the institution 
owning the projects in our sample opted for DBB to reduce the risk of unanticipated 
iterations.  
A generic dynamic model with two phases of design and construction is 
developed based on the SD literature. Historical data from 30 building construction 
projects is used to estimate and validate the model. The model is calibrated with 15 
randomly selected projects and the other 15 projects are used for validation. The 
calibration process is used to estimate three distinct effects: 1) impact of design quality 
on construction quality, 2) the effect of design quality on construction productivity, and 
3) the effect of construction progress on error discovery rate in design. The validation 
process verifies the feasibility of using simple SD models to estimate the likely 
distribution of project outcomes for new projects, a key step in project planning activities. 
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2.1- Data 
A sample of thirty small-to-medium-sized projects was selected from a public 
university construction project archive. Data from DBB projects with the same facility 
type (educational building) were collected, leading to a sample of projects with $0.5-$60 
million in budget. The dataset includes, for each project, the (initially) estimated duration 
(duration based on planning), initially estimated cost, actual duration, actual cost, and the 
cost change trajectory of the project over time (based on owner payments), all separated 
by the design and construction phases. The sample statistics for estimated time-to-finish 
(F0), the ratio of actual to estimated time to finish (F/F0), estimated cost (W0), and the 
ratio of actual to estimated cost (W/W0) are shown in Table 1 for design (D) and 
construction (C) phases of calibration and validation projects.1 Projects in our sample 
show, on average, 10-50% schedule or cost overrun, depending on the phase and 
subsample. Coming from the same organization, industry, project type, and size, this 
sample allows us to control for some of the factors contributing to performance variation 
but unobservable in our data. However, the homogeneity of our sample also limits the 
generalizability of the results. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of calibration (n=15) and validation (n=15) data 
 
                                                 
1 Variable names start with the phase (C for Construction and D for Design) followed by the descriptive 
concept. 
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2.2- Model development 
We developed a system dynamics construction project model that was informed 
by the literature, first author’s direct observations in the field, and a few interviews with 
project stakeholders. The model is developed at the level of design and construction 
phases. In each phase, the completion of tasks was followed by a review process (called 
Design Review and Inspection in the design and construction phases, respectively (Figure 
1)). In each phase, the work and review activities are modeled utilizing a simple rework 
cycle formulation (Richardson and Pugh 1981)(Richardson G. P. and Pugh, 
1981)(Richardson G. P. and Pugh, 1981)(Richardson G. P. and Pugh, 1981)(Richardson 
G. P. and Pugh, 1981)(Richardson G. P. and Pugh, 1981). While more complex rework 
cycle formulations exist (e.g., see Rahmandad and Hu 2010), the simple formulation, 
with three stocks for Work To Do, Accepted Work, and Undiscovered Rework, is 
consistent with the level of aggregation available from our data, which does not include 
details on individual tasks. Moreover, we allow negative values for rework to capture 
Sample Variable Unit Mean Std Dev Median  Minimum Maximum
Calibration D_F0 Month 10.9 7.70 5.83 3.5 26.3
D F/F0 Dmnl 1.4 0.37 1.22 1.0 2.1
D W0 $ (M) 1.48 1.59 0.60 0.07 4.42
D W/W0 Dmnl 1.3 0.31 1.21 0.9 2.2
C F0 Month 32.0 18.39 31.10 9.4 65.0
C F/F0 Dmnl 1.4 0.47 1.42 0.9 2.6
C W0 $ (M) 18.14 20.56 6.35 0.35 55.06
C W/W0 Dmnl 1.1 0.29 1.05 0.7 1.8
Validation D F0 Month 12.0 10.81 10.43 3.3 47.2
D F/F0 Dmnl 1.2 0.26 1.07 1.0 1.7
D W0 $ (M) 1.12 1.27 0.58 0.11 4.06
D W/W0 Dmnl 1.1 0.19 1.11 0.9 1.7
C F0 Month 27.7 16.64 24.97 11.0 68.6
C F/F0 Dmnl 1.5 0.39 1.43 1.0 2.1
C W0 $ (M) 12.06 14.28 6.37 0.35 42.32
C W/W0 Dmnl 1.1 0.07 1.07 0.9 1.2
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scope reduction. However, scope reduction is conceptually different from rework and 
thus is fed into a separate stock that is kept out of the rework cycle, while the positive 
rework flows through the Undiscovered Rework stock and later shows up for rework. The 
value of the negative rework stock is subtracted from Work To Do to reflect the actual 
scope at any point in time. 
 
Figure 1: Construction project work flow 
Figure 2 overviews the model developed in Vensim™. The model captures two 
phases of design and construction in two separate rework loops. The project-specific 
parameters of production rate (P), error rate (E), and time to detect undiscovered rework 
(D), are normalized by project initial values (i.e., initial work (W0) and Duration (T0)) to 
make them comparable across different projects. 
In practice, the starting and finishing of each DBB project is regulated by five 
events: 1) Design Start, 2) Construction Document (CD) Finish, 3) Construction Start, 4) 
Construction Finish, and 5) Design Service (DS) Finish. Design Start, D_Start, is the 
event that initiates design. Design finishes when construction documents (CD) are 
approved and delivered for the bidding process. We track the time at which the design 
phase is perceived to be complete by the variable DCD_Finish. We consider the design 
phase as complete when no known task is left to do, even though some undiscovered 
rework may exist. Design CD finish triggers the start of the bidding process, during 
Design ConstructionReview Inspection
Design Phase Construction Phase
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which neither design nor construction activities progress, and therefore we do not include 
this period in our models. The next event, the construction start (C_Start), commences at 
the end of the bidding process. Construction proceeds until the construction finish, 
C_Finish, event occurs, when the construction progress passes a 99% threshold of scope.  
Meanwhile, some design rework, undiscovered at the design finish, will be discovered 
and fixed during the construction phase. 
In DBB projects, usually the same architectural and engineering (A/E) designer 
who did the initial design is recruited to provide design services (DS) during the 
construction phase; therefore the initial design and later design services could be seen as 
the same process and are both represented within a single stock-and-flow diagram. The 
last event is the end of design services, DDS_Finish, which is triggered when the 
approved design work passes the 99% threshold of scope. We use our data to specify the 
D_Start and C_Start events for each project, while the DCD_Finish, C_Finish, and 
DDS_Finish are all endogenously calculated through simulation.   
Inter-phase relationships between design and construction have been discussed in 
prior literature. Some researchers have proposed the design rework/error as the main 
contributor to (lack of) construction quality. Lyneis and Ford (2007) call this the Errors 
Build Errors effect as the quality of downstream work, e.g. Construction, is reduced by 
undiscovered errors in upstream work, e.g. design. They include consulting evidence 
(Cooper 1980; Lyneis, Cooper and Els 2001) and several academic studies as examples in 
which these inter-phase effects are explicitly included (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991; 
Rodrigues and Bowers 1996; Ford et al. 1998; Ford, Anderson, Damron et al. 2004). 
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Others have proposed design change as the main contributor to reduced construction 
labor productivity (Ibbs 1997; Hanna et al. 1999; Hanna et al. 2002; Hanna et al. 2004; 
Ibbs 2005; Moselhi et al. 2005). Ford and Sterman (1998) developed a four-phase 
product development project model, in which they identified three inter-phase 
interactions: 1) work progress in upstream activities constrains progress in downstream 
activities, 2) downstream work is corrupted by upstream errors, and 3) coordination 
between downstream and upstream activities is required to correct errors. 
In specifying the key feedbacks, we augmented the literature with qualitative data. 
The first author interviewed three senior project managers who had been involved in 
several of the projects in our sample. The field experts were individually interviewed in 
five separate sessions. We first provided them with a brief background of notations and 
basic ideas in project modeling, including the Rework Cycle. The experts were then 
asked to list the important design and construction interactions based on their experience 
and to support each with a real example. At the end of the interviews, we asked our 
experts to rank the first three high-impact causal links across the two phases. Consistent 
with the prior literature, the following inter-phase relationships were overwhelmingly 
selected by our panel as the most important mechanisms, worthy of further consideration. 
1. Undiscovered design rework may increase construction error rate 
2. Undiscovered design rework may slow down construction production rate 
3. Construction progress may increase the detection rate of undiscovered design 
rework 
We therefore model these three feedback mechanisms between design and 
construction phases. We capture the first knock-on mechanism, Error Domino Effect, in 
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Equation 1. The parameter SED specifies the strength of the Error Domino Effect, which 
we estimate as an industry-wide (i.e., project-independent) parameter. We assume the 
construction error rate is a function of the undiscovered rework in the design phase 
multiplied by a project-specific parameter representing base construction error rate, 
detailed in Equation 2. The undiscovered design rework (D_UndiscoveredRework) is 
normalized against initial design scope, DW0. As noted above, we allow negative values 
for rework to capture scope reduction, but account for these separately in a stock for 
scope reduction.  
Error Domino Effect = 1/(1+D_UndiscoveredRework / DW0)SED 
Equation 1 
 
C_InfluencedErrorRate = Min(1,Max(-1, CE * Error domino effect)) 
Equation 2 
 
In the absence of data on human resources allocated to the project, in each phase a 
single productivity parameter is used to capture both the number of project employees 
and the productivity per full-time equivalent (FTE) employee. While this factor, DP is 
assumed constant in the design phase for each project (but different across different 
projects), the construction work rate is impacted by the undiscovered rework in the 
previous (i.e., design) phase, through the Slowdown Effect (Equation 3). This is the 
second knock-on effect in our model and includes an industry-wide parameter for the 
strength of the slowdown effect, SSD, that we estimate in the calibration. Equation 4 
demonstrates how we calculate the work rate using a project-specific parameter for 
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production (CP or DP, depending on the phase; to be estimated in calibration) and two 
project-specific data inputs: initial work (W0) and estimated work duration (T0). 
Slowdown Effect =1/ (1 + D_UndiscoveredRework / DW0)SSD Equation 3 
 
C_WorkRate = CW0 / CT0 * CP * Slowdown Effect Equation 4 
 
Rework discovery is assumed to happen through a first-order draining from the 
stock of undiscovered rework. The time constant for this delay is set as another project-
specific constant (D) for the construction phase. However, we assume the construction 
progress allows faster discovery of design problems and therefore will reduce the time 
constant for rework discovery in the design phase. We call this third inter-phase factor 
the Reality Check Effect (Equation 5). We estimate the strength of the Reality Check 
Effect, SRC, in calibration. Equation 6 shows how time to detect rework (D) is normalized 
and how Reality Check Effect influences the design rework detection rate. 
Reality Check Effect = 1/(1+C_Progress)SRC Equation 5 
D_DetectionRate = D_UndiscoveredRework / (DD * DT0 * Reality Check 
Effect) 
Equation 6 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the causal relationships in the model. For 
clarity, the switches and variables that regulate the activation of different phases are not 
shown. Parameters that are calibrated are highlighted in bold and larger font, with 
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exogenous variables such as initial scope and schedule in underlined italics. Full model 
documentation  (Martinez-Moyano 2012), following minimum model documentation 
guidelines (Rahmandad and Sterman 2012), is available in an online appendix with the 
complete simulation model.   
 
Figure 2: Overview of the model causal structure 
3- Model Estimation  
In the calibration step we estimate the parameters of our generic model to match 
the 15 randomly selected calibration projects. The estimation results are used for two 
purposes. First, they inform the range and distribution of project-specific parameters (i.e., 
error rate (E), production rate (P), and time to detect rework (D) for the two phases of 
design and construction). This information can then be used to form expectations on these 
parameter values when simulating a new project. Second, and central to the goal of this 
paper, we want to estimate the three inter-phase feedback effects (Error Domino, 
Slowdown, and Reality Check effects). These estimates are relevant both theoretically 
and for practical project planning purposes.  
3.1- Estimation Framework 
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Calibration is typically conducted as a numerical optimization to estimate model 
parameters by minimizing the error between the model outputs and data (Oliva 2003). In 
our project we minimize an objective (payoff) function that is a linear combination of 
three sources of error: the differences between data and model in finish time, total cost, 
and cost curve, across both phases. Figure 3 illustrates these payoff function components.  
 
 
Figure 3: Calibration payoff function components 
Equation 7 and Equation 8 formulate the payoff functions for design and 
construction, respectively. Equation 7 includes four elements for the design phase, 
summed over project index i: 1) the squared percentage2 error of design construction 
document finish (DCD), 2) the squared percentage error of design services during 
                                                 
2 In calculating the percentages we use the average of actual and simulated in the denominator. This avoids 
division by zero early in the calibration process, while keeping the payoff function robust. The alternative 
formulation that includes only the actual values in the denominator does not make any qualitative 
difference in the results but leads to more computational errors. 
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construction (DDS), 3) the squared percentage error of design total cost (DCT) and 4) the 
squared percentage error of design cost curve (DCC(t)). We approximate design cost 
curve by adding actual changes to a linear trajectory of cost distributed over project life. 
Equation 8 formulates the construction payoff function in the same manner, except that 
the construction payoff function has only one component for time, which is construction 
finish time (CF).  
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= ��𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 �  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 −  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠  �𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠� +  �𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠��2 + 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 �  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 −  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠  �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠� +  �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠��2  𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠 � �  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) −  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� +  �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)��2  𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠0  � 
Equation 8 
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The errors are normalized into percentages so that they can be linearly combined 
using weights which represent the relative importance of different components. These 
weights are specified subjectively based on the researchers’ relative confidence in the 
precision of the data and the amount of information contained. For example, the cost 
curve is less reliable because it was reconstructed using the project invoice log, which 
does not perfectly match the actual completion.  Therefore we reduce the weight for the 
cost curve and increase it for the more reliable final time and cost. Consequently, the 
following weights are used in the calibration results reported here: 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 13 ,𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =
1
3
,𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 16 ,𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 16 , and 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 12 , 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 14 ,𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 14. Finally, the design and 
construction payoff functions are combined with equal weights (𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 = 12 ,𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 = 12 ), to 
construct the total payoff to be minimized (see Equation 9). We perform some sensitivity 
analysis on the assumptions regarding the weights for the payoff function components 
and find little substantial difference within reasonable ranges for these parameters (see 
the section “Robustness of Calibration Results”). 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 Equation 9 
 
For calibration, 15 projects out of the 30 are randomly selected. Each project is 
simulated separately in the model. However, to maximize the statistical power in 
estimating the inter-phase feedback effects, we assume that the parameters for those 
effects, SED, SSD, and SRC, are common industry-wide and thus are the same across these 
15 projects. Therefore the 15 projects are linked together through these parameters and 
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this requires simultaneous estimation of all projects (rather than one-by-one estimation). 
In general, we can classify the model parameters into two groups: 1) project-specific 
parameters, which are independent from one project to another, and 2) industry-wide 
parameters, which are common across all projects. The project-specific parameters 
consist of production rate (P), error rate (E), and time to detect undiscovered reworks (D) 
for each phase (a total of 6 parameters for each project), while the industry parameters 
include SED, SSD, and SRC. Calibration was conducted in Vensim DSS 5.8 by 
simultaneously estimating the project-specific and industry parameters over 15 
calibration projects, leading to a total of 93 (=15*6+3) parameters to be estimated.  
The large parameter space required us to perform the calibration in three phases. 
First, we conducted an optimization using Vensim’s built-in Powell conjugate search 
algorithm with multiple start points in the parameter space, and using a coarse time step 
and convergence threshold to find a promising neighborhood for parameters. In the 
second phase we first fixed industry parameters, SED, SSD, and SRC (using values from step 
1), and optimized the model, project by project, changing the project-specific parameters 
P, E, and D. These 15 separate calibrations provide reliable neighborhoods for all project-
specific parameters. Then we fixed project-specific parameters P, E, and D and optimized 
the model on all projects, only allowing industry parameters SED, SSD, and SRC to change. 
These steps were repeated iteratively until parameter values converged. In phase three, 
we fine-tuned the results in a single optimization, starting from the point found in the 
previous step and allowing all the parameters to change with higher-resolution time-step 
and optimization settings. For more details, please see model documentation in the online 
appendix.  
20 
 
3.2- Estimation Results 
Following the preceding procedure, industry parameters were estimated as 
SED=2.528, SSD=1.262, and SRC=1.188. Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and 
correlation matrix of the project-specific calibrated parameters.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and Correlation matrix of calibrated project-level parameters. These  
parameters are dimensionless. 
 Mean StdDev D_P D_E D_D C_P C_E C_D 
D_P 0.95 0.22 1.00      
D_E 0.21 0.12 0.41 1.00     
D_D 1.32 0.81 -0.43 -0.71 1.00    
C_P 0.86 0.44 0.21 0.34 -0.47 1.00   
C_E 0.07 0.14 0.02 -0.46 0.60 -0.35 1.00  
C_D 0.43 0.50 0.21 0.05 0.09 -0.48 -0.19 1.00 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the absolute percent error (APE) of finish time, final 
cost, and cost curve of design and construction, respectively, for the 15 projects. DAPE 
and CAPE are the weighted average errors linearly combined with the same weights used 
in the payoff function. The sequence of projects on the horizontal axis is based on these 
values sorted in descending order. Figure 6 and Figure 7  report the best and worst fits 
among the calibrated projects. 
21 
 
 
Figure 4: Design calibration error 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Construction calibration errors 
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Figure 6: Simulation result of Project P011 (Best fit).  Design CD Finish = 23.4 (Simulated), 23.8 
(Actual). Construction Finish = 74.5 (Simulated), 74.2 (Actual) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Simulation result of Project P062 (Worst fit). Design CD Finish = 6.6 (Simulated), 
7.0(Actual). Construction Finish = 17.6 (Simulated), 19.9 (Actual) 
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3.3- Robustness of Estimation Results 
We conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of calibration 
results. First, we evaluate the confidence we can have in the values reported for the 
feedback parameters SED, SSD, and SRC. Specifically, we change these parameters around 
their estimated value and measure the fractional change in the payoff. In the absence of a 
formal maximum likelihood interpretation for the payoff function, we heuristically use a 
5% change in payoff as a threshold that signals incongruence between the parameters and 
the data.3 The results offer the following approximate feasible ranges for the three 
parameters: 0.2<SED<4.2, 0.56<SSD<1.64, and 0.91<SRC<1.39. All effects remain positive 
in this confidence interval. The tightest estimates belong to SRC (the Reality Check 
effect), followed by SSD (the Slowdown effect). 
A second sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess the weighting functions used 
in defining the calibration payoff. Ten different scenarios are defined with different sets 
of weights listed in Table 3. The model is re-calibrated under each scenario. The impact 
of error weight on different scenarios is calculated by the average of the absolute 
percentage change of calibrated parameters. The results show no more than 6% variation 
in this metric across all scenarios. These findings suggest that the calibration results are 
robust in the reasonable range of payoff weights. 
                                                 
3 While the complex non-parametric structure of the distributions rules out theoretical proofs, we think the 
5% threshold is reasonable. For demonstration, consider a maximum likelihood-based payoff function with 
normally distributed errors (which, similarly to our setting, leads to normalized squared error terms in the 
log-likelihood function). For a sample with N effective data points (i.e., total data points minus the number 
of parameters), the range of a typical log-likelihood function at the best-fit position is (roughly speaking, 
being a chi-square distribution with N degrees of freedom) around N. In such a setting, depending on the 
confidence levels required, a reduction of approximately 4 units in the log-likelihood (i.e., 4/N in fractional 
terms) signifies reasonable confidence intervals (e.g., around 95%). With an N value well above 100 in our 
setting (15 projects each having 5 single data points and 2 time series of approximately 10 data points, 
minus the 93 parameters estimated), a fractional change in payoff of 5%  provides realistic approximate 
bounds on the estimated parameters. 
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Table 3: Scenarios of error weight sensitivity analysis 
Scenario WD_CD WD_DS WD_CT WD_CC WC_F WC_CT WC_CC 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 
3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
4 20 20 1 1 2 1 1 
5 2 2 10 1 2 1 1 
6 2 2 1 10 2 1 1 
7 2 2 1 1 20 1 1 
8 2 2 1 1 2 10 1 
9 2 2 1 1 2 1 10 
10 20 20 10 10 2 1 1 
3-4. Inter-phase Project Feedback Effects 
Figure 8 shows the magnitude of the inter-phase feedback impacts on construction 
error rate (diamonds in Panel a), construction production rate (squares in Panel a) and 
time to detect undiscovered design rework (Panel b) using the calibrated values 
(SED=2.528, SSD=1.262 and SRC=1.188). Looking at the simulations across our full 
sample, we note that the fraction of undiscovered design error of initial design work (x-
axis in panel a) does not exceed 20%. This range confines the Error Domino and 
Slowdown effects to about 50% and extrapolation outside of this range is not warranted 
based on the current analysis. The Reality Check effect’s input, construction progress, 
ranges in the full scale of 0 to 1 and influences rework discovery time in the design 
phase. 
  
 
Fraction 
b 
 
a 
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Figure 8: a) Impact of Error Domino Effect and Slowdown Effect b) Impact of Reality Check Effect 
 
4- Predicting the Performance of New Projects 
Project planning could be an important use-case for any dynamic model of 
projects. The parameters estimated in the previous section can be used to forecast the 
trajectory of a new project before it has started, potentially offering enhanced prediction 
and risk assessment for project planning. A simple approach is to use the averages of the 
15 sets of calibrated parameters for the parameters of the prediction model. This 
approach, however, ignores the significant variability observed in the parameters across 
different projects. Ignoring the variability would give more confidence to the projections 
than is warranted and deprive the user of much valuable information regarding the 
expected distribution of potential performance outcomes. Therefore, we use a more 
realistic approach that assumes the six project-specific parameters are random variables 
with a given mean and covariance structure, which can be found from our estimated 
parameters. We will then generate 1000 samples with the same mean and covariance 
matrices for these six parameters using the variance-covariance method.  
The estimated parameters are correlated, with statistics reported in Table 2, and 
their distribution is skewed. After some exploratory analysis we find log-normal to be a 
good distribution to characterize them. We therefore first apply a logarithmic 
transformation to the estimated project-level parameters and calculate the mean (μ) and 
covariance (∑) of the resulting multivariate normal distribution. Next, using Equation 10, 
a multivariate normal sample, R, is produced that matches the joint distribution of the 
(transformed) calibrated parameters. Here R0-1 is standard normal distribution and matrix 
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U is the square root of the covariance matrix, ∑, calculated by Cholesky decomposition 
method (Golub and Van Loan 1996). Finally, the resulting sample is transformed back 
into log-normal distributions, generating RT, to be used in the Monte-Carlo simulation 
experiments.  
[R]=[µ]+ [U]*[R0-1] Equation 10 
 
Where:  [∑]=[U]T [U] Equation 11 
 
Next, a Monte-Carlo simulation generates the distribution of model outcomes 
using sample RT and a given initial plan (i.e., DW0, CW0, DT0, and CT0).  Figure 9 shows 
the simulation result for an example project against actual outcomes. Initial scope and 
schedule are typically available at the beginning of any project, but are unreliable and 
often underestimate the actual costs and schedule significantly. These estimates are the 
only project-specific inputs we need in our model to generate the ensemble of possible 
performance projections for a new project. The project above is simulated with the 1000 
sets of randomly generated parameters discussed above. Of the samples, 11% (113 out of 
1000) were found infeasible as they did not result in design and construction completion 
in a reasonable amount of time. Comparing actual project outcomes against remaining 
simulations, we find design and construction times slightly higher than the predicted 
simulated sample median, and costs lower than the median. In all cases the actual values 
are within the 95% confidence levels from the simulated samples. The general fit is 
reasonable, given that many other relevant factors such as project type (new/renovation), 
location, and complexity, were not considered in this analysis. 
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The failure of some of the simulated projects to reach completion results from 
parameter combinations that lead to very high error rates and/or low productivity, and 
extend the project duration beyond reasonable ranges. This could reflect both 
inaccuracies in the parameter distributions as well as real-world mechanisms that may 
lead to failure of actual projects. In fact, many projects fail to reach completion in 
practice due to feedbacks that compromise the quality and productivity of troubled 
projects (Repenning 2001; Taylor and Ford 2006). However, given the small sample we 
use for calibration and the resulting uncertainty in the generation of joint distributions, 
the fraction of failed projects in this simulation is not a reliable indicator of actual 
projects’ propensity to fail. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of actual outcomes for one validation project against Monte-Carlo 
simulations. a) Design finish, Mean=16.1, StDev=3.72, Actual=18.1(month) b) Construction finish, 
Mean=46.3.0, StDev=11.76, Actual=65.9(month) c) Design final cost, Mean=$1.8M, StDev=$0.28M, 
Actual=$1.5 d) Construction final cost, Mean=$18.9M, StDev=$3.15M, Actual=$18.5M 
 
4.1- Validation: How well can new projects be predicted? 
Building on the ideas above, we now formally assess the ability of the model to predict 
the actual performance of new projects, given their original scope and schedule. 
Specifically, we repeat the Monte-Carlo process above for the 15 validation projects, 
using the 887 feasible random parameter sets. We consider four metrics, including 
construction document finish time (DF), design cost (DC), construction finish time (CF), 
and construction final cost (CC). The distribution of samples produced by the Monte-
Carlo simulation should be compared with the actual values for each metric and each 
Actual 
Actual 
Actual 
Actual 
a b 
c d 
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project. To simplify the presentation of results and comparisons across different projects, 
the simulated metrics are normalized against the actual values so that the value 1 
represents the true value. These results are reported in Figure 10 in boxplot format 
displaying the interquartile range, mean (plus symbol), and median (solid line), and the 
maximum and minimum. The actual values never fall outside of the prediction envelopes 
and systematic biases are hard to detect by eye. To further explore the existence of such 
biases, we consider how well the overall distribution of predicted metrics matches the 
simulated distributions. 
  
  
Figure 10- Mean (plus symbol), median (line), inter-quartile range, minimum and maximum for 
simulated metrics of each project, normalized around true value (1). a) design construction document 
finish (DF) b) design final cost (DC) c) construction finish (CF) d) construction final cost (CC)  
a b 
c d 
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The best predictive model is the one which not only gets the performance 
measures correct on average (i.e., has no bias in the mean across many samples), but also 
correctly estimates the variability expected in performance. For example, the model 
would have been overestimating the variance if the model’s mean performance always 
matched the actual numbers (i.e., all boxes were set squarely on value 1), because the 
projected variability in outcomes was not borne out by the data. On the other hand, if 
most boxes were above, or below, the true value line, we would identify a bias in the 
model’s predictions. To better assess the overall fit of the projected model metrics against 
the validation data, we create a variant of Q-Q plot which combines the data from all four 
metrics and 15 projects into a single diagnostic graph. Consider n=60 (15*4) actual 
metrics and their corresponding simulated distributions obtained through the Monte-
Carlo results above. First, we find what percentile each data point belongs to on the 
corresponding simulated distribution. The resulting data set includes 60 data points with 
different percentile values. We sort this data set in the ascending order of percentiles and 
graph its values on the x-axis against the y-axis of k/(n+1) for data point k (see Figure 
11). A perfect match will be on the 45-degree line, where the empirical metrics match the 
corresponding percentiles in simulation distributions exactly.  A bias is identified if the 
graph is generally above or below the 45-degree line. A line much steeper than 45 
degrees suggests the model is overestimating the variation in the actual metrics, i.e., it 
predicts many far-fetched values that never actually materialize in practice. Conversely, a 
line less steep than 45 degrees signals the model’s overconfidence, i.e., projecting as 
unlikely the values that are seen regularly in practice. Finally, the goodness of fit between 
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a linear model and the data indicates how close the overall distribution of actual 
outcomes is to the predictions. 
 
Figure 11: Q-Q plot, Percentile of true value against uniform distribution 
 
The linear regression analysis performed on the Q-Q data series shows a very 
good fit between the data and the regressed line with R2 of 0.99. Moreover, the deviations 
of estimated values (intercept=0.014 with standard deviation of 0.008 and slope=0.976 
with standard deviation of 0.014) from the theoretical values for a perfect model 
(intercept=0 and slope=1) are not statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. 
Combined with the high quality of fit, these metrics suggest that the overall distribution 
of the predicted outcomes is indistinguishable from the actual distributions in the 
validation set. Therefore, this analysis provides further evidence in support of the 
viability of our predictive model: not only does our model offer a good prediction for the 
actual outcomes, but it also indicates the variance that can be expected in the outcomes of 
the projects. 
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Despite the reliable fit provided by our prediction method, the range of variation 
for the predicted metrics is notable. Essentially, the model predicts much potential 
variation in projects due to factors that are not endogenously captured in the current 
simulation, but are reflected in the uncertainty in the key project-level parameters. 
Therefore, absence of data on other relevant factors such as project type, location, and 
complexity may explain the large range of variation in predicted outcomes. If such data is 
available, it could be integrated into our framework as predictors of productivity, quality, 
and error discovery time parameters, offering a natural connection between the traditional 
project estimation methods and the dynamic framework we propose. 
5- How important are inter-phase feedback effects? 
How much of the variation in project schedule and costs can be attributed to the 
feedback loops we have quantified? The feedback effects we identify are only a subset of 
factors relevant to project heterogeneity. From intra-phase feedbacks (such as burnout, 
morale, and corner cutting), to other inter-phase feedbacks we did not consider, and 
diverse project-specific factors (e.g., size, complexity, novelty, management, 
organization), many other issues are relevant to understanding why projects may end up 
with different outcomes. Our model provides one way to tease out the effects of the 
feedbacks we quantify. Specifically, a good estimate of these impacts requires one to run 
experiments in which only the specific feedback loops are turned on and off, keeping 
everything else constant, so that their unique contribution can be measured. Such 
controlled experiments are not feasible in actual projects, but could be conducted here 
because we have estimated the distributions of project-level parameters that capture 
different contributors to variation, and therefore we can control for those factors. We 
33 
 
simulate five different scenarios with the ensemble of 887 feasible project-level 
parameter sets (see section 4), and switching on/off the three feedback mechanisms. In 
the base scenario we remove all the feedback effects (SED=SSD=SRC=0), in scenarios 1-
3 we include them one at a time, and in scenario 4 we include all the feedbacks 
simultaneously. We then measure the change in the mean of main project outcomes 
(schedule and cost, for each phase, and total) as well as the change in the standard 
deviation of the outcomes. While the change in mean indicates how much the various 
feedbacks contribute to delay and costs, the latter change measure indicates how much of 
variability in project outcomes is due to each reinforcing loop. These results are reported 
in Table 4. 
Table 4: The percent change of mean and standard deviation in duration and cost across 
different scenarios as compared to the scenario with no feedback.  
 
Scenario Metric Design Duration 
Const. 
Duration 
Total 
Duration 
Design 
Cost 
Const. 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Scenario 2 
Error Domino 
Δ Mean 0.0% 2.5% 1.6% 0.0% 1.2% 1.0% 
Δ StDev 0.0% 2.7% 2.7% 0.0% 23.3% 24.9% 
Scenario 3 
Slowdown 
Δ Mean 0.0% 8.5% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Δ StDev 0.0% 2.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Scenario 4 
Reality Check 
Δ Mean -19.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Δ StDev -44.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Scenario 5 
All Feedbacks 
Δ Mean -17.9% 9.2% 5.8% 0.1% 0.9% 0.8% 
Δ StDev -43.5% 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 18.7% 20.0% 
Overall, the feedbacks have a relatively small effect on the average cost (~1%) 
and a modest but notable impact on average duration (5.8%). They provide a more 
important explanatory mechanism for understanding heterogeneity, explaining 4.2% of 
variation in schedule and 20% of cost variation. The biggest contributor to cost variation 
is the Error Domino effect. In fact, the other two feedbacks have very little impact on the 
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cost variation. The Slowdown effect is more relevant to understanding the changes in 
duration of projects, and variation in duration. The impact of Reality Check feedback is 
rather limited and largely related to the duration of design phase. Finally, noting the 
higher total cost and cost heterogeneity in Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 5, we can 
identify an interesting interaction between Error Domino and Slowdown effects. In the 
presence of the Slowdown effect (Scenario 5), the lower productivity leads to longer 
construction duration (9.2% vs. 2.5% in Scenario 2), which in turn increases the amount 
of design error discovered compared to Scenario 2. Increased error discovery helps avoid 
some of the rework in construction, which reduces the overall construction cost in 
Scenario 5 compared to 2, even though the total duration of the project is higher in the 
presence of both feedbacks. 
While these effects are not huge, they reflect the independent effect of the inter-
phase feedbacks we estimate after excluding many relevant feedback effects within each 
phase of the project as well as non-feedback sources of variation, from project size and 
complexity to technology. Hence, the fact that inter-phase feedbacks may actually be 
explaining as much as 20% of heterogeneity in project costs is notable. 
6- Discussion and Conclusions 
Theoretical and Empirical Findings. We empirically estimate three design-
construction feedback relationships and show that 1) undiscovered design rework 
increases construction error rate (Error Domino effect) 2) undiscovered design rework 
slows down construction production rate (Slowdown effect), and 3) construction progress 
increases the detection rate of undiscovered design rework (Reality Check effect). To our 
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knowledge this is the first empirical estimation of these feedback relationships, which we 
identify using empirical data from 15 construction projects. The empirical estimates 
validate qualitative hypotheses in this domain and suggest that the inter-phase feedback 
mechanisms on quality, productivity, and rework discovery time are important and of a 
magnitude that can make a significant impact on project dynamics. On average, we find 
these feedbacks may be explaining as much as 20% of variation in project costs and 6% 
of delays. The impact of these feedback mechanisms on a specific project’s performance 
also depends on the base values of project quality, and to a lesser extent, productivity. For 
example, cutting one of these feedbacks in projects with high error rates (CE ~ 30% in 
our sample) leads to 5-10% overall cost variation; the effects are less pronounced for 
projects that start with a high quality, and thus have limited room for variation in quality 
due to the feedback effects.  
Moreover, we find that error rates are typically higher in the design phase than 
construction (DE > CE), and take longer to be discovered (DD > CD). Interestingly, 
average productivity multipliers are higher in design (DP > CP), suggesting design 
phases that are completed on time, but with many undiscovered errors. Therefore, we 
expect higher emphasis on the design phase in many projects would prove fruitful. The 
estimated feedback effects explain a notable share of heterogeneity in project costs 
(~20%). We also find that much project variation originates from differences in the base 
value of quality and productivity. In our setting these base values aggregate diverse 
underlying factors, such as employee skills, project complexity, technology, management 
quality, and dynamic factors such as corner cutting, among others (Lyneis et al. 2007); 
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more detailed data can allow for unpacking project performance heterogeneity further 
using a similar simulation and calibration framework. 
Given the interactions between the baseline quality and the inter-phase feedbacks, 
we expect these feedback processes to be most important in explaining the fate of 
projects in the tail of performance distribution. While many projects are completed close 
to initial plans, tales of projects gone wrong are common and attract much public scrutiny 
(Pear et al. 2013). Our study highlights the risk of one relevant failure mode, identified 
by several other researchers (Repenning 2001; Repenning, Goncalves and Black 2001; 
Ford and Sterman 2003; Taylor et al. 2006), that is rooted in multiple reinforcing 
mechanisms: some projects spend too little on upfront design quality, leading to problems 
that are harder to discover and much more costly to fix down the line. The resulting 
unexpected rework pushes the project further out of control, so that multiple aspects of 
the project suffer simultaneously: design problems hurt the relationship between design 
and construction and slow rework; schedule pressure may lead to burnout, corner cutting, 
and further quality erosion; and loss of experienced employees escalates the rework costs 
(Hanna et al. 2002; Lyneis et al. 2007). Moreover, the resulting threats to reputation and 
job security may trigger defensive routines inside project organizations, promote a culture 
of opaqueness, and put at risk the future projects managed by the same organization 
(Ford et al. 2003). These dynamics may be intuitive, but time and again prove central to 
the troubles of organizations across different industries (Repenning 2001; Repenning and 
Sterman 2002). In fact, if impervious to these mechanisms, following the traditional 
project management mindset, which seeks above all to keep the project on plan, may 
actually exacerbate the problems by pushing the team to work harder and focus on the 
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deadline, rather than finding and fixing the root causes of emerging problems (Herroelen 
and Leus 2004; Williams 2005). 
Practical Implications. The managerial implications of these dynamics may 
seem straightforward: project managers need to put more emphasis on upfront design 
activities and ensure high quality early on. As a corollary, they should also be sensitive to 
signs of burnout, fear, mistrust, and communication breakdown in their teams. In fact, 
managing work pressure and resource loading should be pursued with a focus on 
avoiding such defensive organizational routines. Moreover, encouraging early discovery 
and revelation of problems and instituting root-cause analysis, automated testing, and 
other quality-inducing capabilities can help set the right tone inside the organization. 
Finally, given the large set of uncertainties involved, managers should be flexible in 
updating initial plans when the conditions on the ground call for that; and delegate more 
responsibility to those on the frontlines who often have a more nuanced understanding of 
the actual tasks, performance, and quality, and thus can solve the problems at their root. 
Operationalizing this advice may be easier said than done, however: the metrics of 
performance built into conventional project management tools (and education) ignore 
many of the relevant soft variables and the feedback mechanisms we discuss (Browning 
2010). Moreover, the worse-before-better tradeoffs involved in upfront quality and 
organizational capability investments make it harder to learn and pursue the more flexible 
learning-focused style of project management (Repenning et al. 2002; Williams 2005; 
Rahmandad 2008; Williams 2008), especially in large and uncertain projects with 
significant sociopolitical complexities (Geraldi et al. 2011).  Incorporating into project 
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tracking tools metrics that indicate the state of key feedback mechanisms may provide 
one avenue to operationalize this advice.  
Besides better quantifying the origins of fat tails in project performance 
distribution and the related managerial implications, our estimates are beneficial for 
resolving the resulting disagreements when projects go wrong. The large and notable 
failures in projects frequently lead to legal disputes and require model-based assessment 
of root causes of those failures to resolve such disputes (Cooper 1980; Ackermann et al. 
1997; Stephens, Graham and Lyneis 2005). These modeling applications require the 
allocation of cost overruns to factors for which customers were responsible (e.g., change 
orders), contractor responsibilities (e.g., errors), and various ripple effects due to project 
feedback mechanisms. Since those ripple effects are relatively large, often larger than the 
costs directly attributable to customers or contractors (Cooper 1980), the quantitative 
estimates for the strength of various feedback loops are essential for a fair allocation of 
costs.  Our estimates provide more reliable measures to quantify a subset of feedbacks 
central to those models.  
Methodological Contributions. Two novel methodological features of this study 
may prove helpful for future research. First, this paper provides a method for rigorous 
representation of project risks through simulation. The majority of operations research 
models of project planning offer a deterministic schedule (Herroelen et al. 2004), and the 
ones that consider risks often assume independence among different risk factors (Taroun 
2014). However, these risks are highly interdependent: on the one hand, quality, 
productivity, and other project-specific parameters share many common determinants, 
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and thus they are highly correlated. On the other hand, the feedback processes active in 
the evolution of a project over time couple different risks. For example, a project that 
falls behind on quality early on is more likely to face additional risks down the line due to 
corner cutting, error domino, slowdown, and other feedbacks. By estimating the 
covariance among project-specific parameters and explicitly modeling the feedbacks, we 
have provided a potential method for quantifying and tracking interdependent risks in 
projects. The resulting model performs very well to match calibration sample projects as 
well as the distributions of validation data. More realistic cost-benefit analysis, portfolio 
planning, and risk management can then be based on such distributions of likely 
outcomes. In fact, our model can be easily used for providing both baseline and risk 
estimates in construction projects with similar scope and complexity, and the basic 
approach can be replicated to inform other types of projects.  
Finally, this study provides a methodological innovation to better extend system 
dynamics modeling to multiple cases. In fact, building models that tackle a class of 
problems, rather than a single case, is among the founding principles of System 
Dynamics (Forrester 1961). However, in practice, given the data availability and 
computational complexities, SD models are often calibrated using data from a single 
case. In a few instances where data from more than one case study is available, the model 
is separately estimated for those cases, treating every model parameter as distinct across 
different cases (e.g., Homer 1987; Sterman 1989). Such treatment foregoes the statistical 
power and generalizability achievable by treating the subset of parameters that transcend 
different cases and thus can have a case-independent value. In the current study we show 
how one can leverage multiple case studies to estimate both case-specific and case-
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independent parameters in dynamic models, using a method that conceptually resembles 
fixed-effect regression. Given the general nonlinear structure of common SD models, 
computational costs and non-convexity of the payoff function could prove challenging in 
this method; nevertheless, careful design of optimization procedure—e.g., using the 
multi-stage method we followed here—can offer a feasible heuristic for finding reliable 
parameter estimates.   
Limitations and Future Research. This study includes several limitations that 
can motivate future research. We did not explicitly consider many potentially relevant 
factors such as project type (new/renovation), location, and project complexity. Such 
factors may impact the project behavior and cost curve, and moderate the feedback 
effects of interest in our setting. Predictions might become more accurate, if such data 
were available and used in the calibration-validation process. Future studies can combine 
surveys of projects with the quantitative and time series data such as those we use here to 
estimate the root causes of variations in productivity, error rate, and rework discovery 
parameters and offer more explicit managerial recommendations based on those. 
Experiments may also be designed to elicit various effects more directly (Bendoly, 
Swink, & Simpson, 2014). Our data was limited to small-to-medium-sized DBB 
construction projects in the U.S., limiting the generalizability of our findings, especially 
the project-specific parameters and their covariance matrix, to other settings. In fact, the 
use of these parameters for prediction in project settings substantially different from ours 
is not warranted. Given the low to moderate structural, dynamic, and sociopolitical 
complexity (Geraldi et al. 2011) of our setting, our estimates may be rather conservative 
in quantifying the impact of inter-phase feedbacks on overall project performance. 
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Additional complexity can interact with these feedbacks, leading to more extreme cases 
of failure; however, the basic mechanisms should remain similar, and thus one may 
expect the estimated individual feedback effects to be less variable with project 
complexity. Finally, more detailed data about the type and scope of different tasks and 
resources allocated to them can enhance the quality of estimation and offer avenues for 
better integration of system dynamics models of projects with traditional project 
management software. 
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